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Abstract
By the late 1990s fertility in the developed world had declined to 1.6 births
per woman, a level substantially lower than projected in the 1980s. This study exam-
ines recent trends and patterns in fertility in the developed world with particular
emphasis on the effects and implications of changes in the timing of childbearing.
The main objective is to demonstrate that while fertility in these countries is indeed
low, women’s childbearing levels are not as low as period measures such as the total
fertility rate suggest. To obtain a full understanding of the various dimensions of
fertility change, several indicators are examined, including period and cohort fertil-
ity by birth order and childbearing preferences. An analysis of these indicators dem-
onstrates that period fertility measures in many developed countries are temporarily
depressed by a rise in the mean age at childbearing. The distortion of the TFR is as
great as  0.4 birth per woman in Italy and Spain. These effects have been present in
many developed countries since the 1970s and could continue for years into the
future. But tempo effects are temporary in nature and once the postponement of
childbearing ends—as it eventually must—the corresponding fertility-depressing ef-
fect stops, thus putting upward pressure on period fertility. Countries with very low
fertility and substantial tempo effects may well experience modest rises in fertility
in the near future if the timing of childbearing stabilizes. Even if this happens, how-
ever, it seems highly unlikely that fertility will rebound to the replacement level.
Over the past quarter-century massive changes in fertility behavior have occurred
in most world regions. Many developing countries have experienced large and rapid
fertility declines, and a number of countries in Asia and Latin America are now ap-
proaching the end of their transitions with fertility around or in a few cases (e.g., China)
even below 2 births per woman. In the “more developed” world (Europe, North America,
Japan, Australia, and New Zealand) average period fertility was already low in the early
1950s and has decreased further to 1.6 births per woman in the late 1990s (United Na-
tions 2001).
These recent fertility declines have been more rapid and pervasive than was
prevously expected. For example, medium variant projections for the late 1990s
prepared by the United Nations Population Division in the 1970s, 1980s, and early
1990s slightly overestimated the fertility levels observed in the 1990s for the world
and many regions. This outcome is primarily attributable to the past assumption that
all countries end their fertility transitions with fertility stabilizing at the replace-
ment level of 2.1 births per woman. This assumption was widely accepted in the
past and it is fair to say that the UN incorporated the consensus of the demographic
community on this issue. Starting with its 1998 revision the UN no longer takes 2.1
as the eventual end point of the transition, and countries with low fertility are now
projected to remain permanently below the replacement level (United Nations 1999,
2001; United Nations Population Division 2000a).
One reason for this uncertainty about future fertility trends is that conven-
tional demographic theory has had little to say about levels and trends in post-tran-
sitional societies (Caldwell 1982). In an attempt to remedy this shortcoming, de-
mographers and social scientists are engaged in an active debate on the causes of
low fertility and the prospects for further change (Chenais 1996, 1998; Lesthaeghe
2001; Lesthaeghe and Willems 1999; McDonald 2000). The matter is of consider-
able importance because further declines in fertility or even a continuation of cur-
rent low fertility levels will contribute to rapid aging of populations and will lead to
decline in the size of national populations. These demographic developments in turn
are likely to have significant social and economic consequences (Coale 1986; OECD
1998; World Bank 1994).
4
This study examines recent trends and patterns in fertility in the developed
world with particular emphasis on the effects and implications of changes in the
timing of childbearing. The main objective is to demonstrate that while fertility in
these countries is indeed low, women’s childbearing levels are not as low as period
measures such as the total fertility rate suggest. This argument has been advanced in
earlier research based on theoretical analysis (Bongaarts and Feeney 1998). The
present study extends this earlier work with more extensive empirical evidence. The
implications for future trends in fertility are discussed in the last section.
FERTILITY LEVELS AND TRENDS
To obtain a fuller understanding of the various dimensions of fertility change
several indicators will be examined, starting with period fertility.
Period fertility
Overviews of recent fertility trends in the developed world are widely available
(Calot 1999; Coleman 1996; Council of Europe 2000; Demeny 1997; Sardon 2000;
United Nations Population Division 2000b); only a brief summary will be provided here
based on estimates from United Nations (2001). In general, fertility as measured by the
total fertility rate (TFR) was well above the replacement level in the 1950s and early
1960s, averaging 2.8 births per woman. In most countries, this period was followed by
one of sharp decline to below-replacement level (to 1.91 on average) between the mid-
1960s and late 1970s. Over the past two decades fertility decline has continued but at a
much slower pace, and in a few countries fertility has turned up slightly—for example,
in Denmark, Finland, Norway, and the United States. In the four decades from the late
1950s to the late 1990s the TFR of the developed world dropped by 44 percent, from
2.82 to 1.57 births per woman, with more than two-thirds of this decline occurring be-
fore the late 1970s.
These average trends conceal much variation among regions and countries. In the
late 1990s the highest total fertility rates were observed in North America (2.00), Aus-
tralia/New Zealand (1.80), and Northern Europe (1.67) and the lowest in Japan (1.41),
Southern Europe (1.32), and Eastern Europe (1.28). The TFRs of particular developed
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countries are as low as 1.2 in Italy, Russia, and Spain while TFRs of 2 births per woman
are found in the US and New Zealand. Although the focus of this analysis is on the
“more developed” world (as defined by the UN), it is worth noting that period fertility
has also dropped below the replacement level in several Asian countries where socioeco-
nomic development has been rapid (e.g., in Hong Kong, Singapore, and South Korea). 1
Cohort fertility
The fertility of a cohort of women born in the same year is usually measured by
the completed fertility rate (CFR), which equals the average number of births per woman
at the end of the childbearing years. Trends in the CFR of successive cohorts have gen-
erally followed the downward trend in period fertility (Frejka and Calot 2001). A sub-
stantive drawback of cohort measures such as the CFR is that they are primarily affected
by childbearing levels in the past. Peak childbearing years occur typically two or three
decades before the end of the reproductive years, when the women whose completed
fertility is being measured were in their 20s and early 30s. The fact that the CFR does
not provide useful information on recent trends in fertility is the main reason cohort
measures are not widely used. However, the CFR does have the considerable advantage
of being an unambiguous and real measure of fertility, while the more up-to-date TFR is
a hypothetical measure that is subject to bias and hence potential misinterpretation, as
will be demonstrated below.
Comparisons of period and cohort fertility are complicated by the fact that child-
bearing of a cohort is spread out over a range of ages and years. Nevertheless, one can
make useful comparisons of completed cohort fertility with the average TFR prevailing
during the years in which the cohort was in its prime childbearing years. Table 1 pre-
sents the completed fertility rate for the 1960 cohort and the average total fertility rate
for 1980–94 when this cohort was between the ages of 20 and 35. The 1960 cohort was
chosen for this exercise because it had reached age 40 by the year 2000. Although this
cohort has not yet completed its childbearing, its future fertility is likely to be modest
and can be projected with considerable confidence (Council of Europe 2000). Table 1
includes the developed countries for which the relevant data were available from the
sources indicated. In this group of countries the average TFR for 1980–94 ranged from
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Table 1 Completed fertility rate (1960 cohort) and estimates of the total fertility rate
(average for 1980–94) for developed countries
Completed fertility Total fertility rate
1960 cohort 1980–94 Difference
Australia 2.12 1.89 0.23
Austria 1.69 1.51 0.18
Belgium 1.84 1.59 0.25
Bulgaria 1.95 1.85 0.10
Czech Republic 2.02 1.89 0.13
Denmark 1.89 1.57 0.32
Estonia 1.99 1.99 0.00
Finland 1.95 1.72 0.23
France 2.10 1.80 0.30
Germany 1.65 1.41 0.24
Greece 1.93 1.64 0.29
Hungary 2.02 1.81 0.21
Iceland 2.49 2.18 0.31
Ireland 2.41 2.40 0.01
Italy 1.65 1.38 0.27
Japan 1.84 1.65 0.19
Luxembourg 1.75 1.53 0.22
Netherlands 1.85 1.55 0.30
New Zealand 2.34 2.02 0.32
Norway 2.09 1.78 0.31
Poland 2.18 2.15 0.03
Portugal 1.90 1.75 0.15
Romania 2.16 2.05 0.11
Russia 1.83 1.89 –0.06
Slovakia 2.17 2.12 0.05
Slovenia 1.87 1.64 0.23
Spain 1.75 1.58 0.17
Sweden 2.04 1.85 0.19
Switzerland 1.77 1.54 0.23
Macedonia 2.29 2.25 0.04
United Kingdom 1.96 1.80 0.16
United States 2.02 1.88 0.14
Note: TFR estimates for Australia and New Zealand are from United Natinos 2001 and refer to the
period from mid-1980 to mid-1995.
Sources: Council of Europe 2000; Sardon 2000; Sato 2001; United Nations 2001.
a low of 1.38 in Italy to a high of 2.40 in Ireland, and the CFR ranged from 1.65 to 2.41
in the same two countries. There is a strong correlation between the CFR and TFR
(r=0.94). A key finding from this comparison of cohort and period fertility is that in all
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but one of these countries (Russia) the CFR of the 1960 cohort exceeds (or in one case
equals) the average TFR for the period 1980–94. This difference averages 0.2 births per
woman for the set of 32 countries in Table 1.
Some analysts have argued that if period fertility remains significantly below the
replacement level of 2.1 births for a long time, then the fertility of the cohorts who did
their childbearing during these years cannot reach replacement fertility. This conclusion
is not correct as is evident, for example, from the data for France. The TFR in France has
been below 2 since the early 1970s and the average TFR for 1980–94 was 1.80. Despite
this low period fertility, the 1960 cohort is expected to have 2.1 children. A similar
pattern is observed in Australia, Norway, and Sweden. The reasons for these differences
between cohort and period fertility will be explored further in a later section.
Birth-order components of fertility
The birth-order components of cohort or period measures of fertility are the parts
of these measures that are attributable to births of given orders. For example, the first-
order component of completed cohort fertility (CFR
1
) is simply the average number of
first births born per woman, which equals the proportion of the cohort that has had a first
birth during their lives; the second-order component (CFR
2
) is the average number of
second births born per woman, which equals the proportion that has had a second birth,
and so forth. The sum of these components equals the CFR. None of the birth-order
components exceeds one, because women can have no more than one birth of any order,
and the components decline in size as order rises, because no woman can have a birth of
a given order without also having had a birth of the preceding order.2 Similar compo-
nents can be calculated for the TFR. For example, the component for births of order 1
(TFR
1
) equals the average number of first births women would have by age 50 if they
were to bear first births at the age-specific rates observed in a given year or period.3
Throughout the present analysis order refers to the biological birth order of the mother,
and data from countries recording births by order within current marriage are therefore
not used. Figure 1 illustrates the birth-order decomposition for cohort and period fertil-
ity in Japan (Sato 2001). The 1960 cohort on average had 1.84 children, which is the
sum of 0.84 births of order 1, 0.70 of order 2, 0.26 of order 3, and 0.05 of order 4 or
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higher. Similarly, the total fertility rate for 1980–94 was 1.65 births per woman, which is the
sum of 0.73 births of order 1, 0.64 of order 2, 0.24 of order 3 and 0.04 of order 4 or higher.
The first-order component of cohort fertility (CFR
1
) is of special interest because,
by subtracting it from 1.0, one obtains the proportion childless among women in the
cohort. For example, the CFR
1
 for the 1960 cohort in Japan equals 0.84, which means
that 16 percent of these women are childless. Figure 2 plots estimates of the CFR
1
 for
the 1960 cohort for 17 countries for which these data are available. The CFR
1
 ranges in
size from 0.97 in Bulgaria to 0.82 in Italy, indicating levels of childlessness of 3 percent
in the former country and 18 percent in the latter.
A comparison of these cohort results with the first-order component of period
fertility (CFR
1
 for the 1960 cohort and TFR
1
 for 1980–89, respectively4) in the same
countries reveals substantial differences (see Figure 2). Specifically, the period-based



































































































































































































calculated for cohorts in most of these countries. An explanation for the unexpectedly
small sizes of these first-order components of period fertility will be given shortly.
Timing of childbearing
The most widely used indicator of timing is the mean age at childbearing (MAC).
The MAC can be measured either for cohorts or for specific periods, but the focus here
is on period measures of timing. In European countries the MAC for 1995 was typically
in the late 20s, ranging from 24.3 years in Bulgaria to 30.2 years in Ireland and the
Netherlands (Council of Europe 2000). Similar averages are obtained in Japan (29.4)
and the United States (26.8) (Sato 2001; Ventura et al. 1997).
Changes over time in the mean age at childbearing are the result of two demo-
graphic factors. The first is the decline in higher-order births that occurs as societies
move through their fertility transitions. Fertility declines are observed at all orders but
they are usually far larger at higher than at lower orders. In other words, in contempo-
rary societies with fertility around 2 births per women, most women have at least one
birth as was the case historically, but the number of third and higher-order births is much
smaller than in the past. As a result, the mean age at childbearing declines even if there
is no change in the timing of births of each order. The second factor is the change in the
timing of births of specific orders. The net effect of these two factors varies among
societies. In many contemporary developing countries the decline in higher-order births
is occurring more rapidly than the rise in the timing of individual births, so that the mean
age at childbearing is declining (Bongaarts 1999a). In contrast, in most contemporary
industrialized countries the rise in the mean age at first and higher-order births is occur-
ring so rapidly that their effect exceeds any birth-order composition effect. The mean
age at childbearing has therefore risen over the past two decades in most developed
countries (Council of Europe 2000).
For present purposes the trend in the mean age at first births (MAC
1
) is of special
interest, because it is the key factor determining trends in higher birth orders. Figure 3
plots trends in MAC
1
 for a number of large developed countries. In each of these the
mean age at first birth has risen sharply since the mid-1970s. During the 1980s increases
exceeding 1 year per decade were observed in many European countries including France,
11
Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom as well as in Japan and the United States. This
upward trend continues unabated in the 1990s in most countries, although in the United
States the MAC
1
 leveled off briefly around 1990.
Fertility preferences
Evidence on women’s childbearing intentions and a comparison of these inten-
tions with actual fertility can shed light on current childbearing behavior. Table 2 pre-
sents the average number of children ultimately wanted by women aged 30–34 for 15
countries participating in the Fertility and Family Surveys project undertaken in the
ECE region (including the US and Canada) in the early 1990s. This preference indicator
is obtained by adding the number of children a survey respondent already has to the
additional number wanted over the remainder of her reproductive years. Average ulti-
mate wanted family size for these women is quite similar in this group of countries,




















Sources: Council of Europe 2000; Sato 2001; Bongaarts and Feeney 1998.
Figure 3   Mean age of women at first birth in selected industrialized countries
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ranging from 2.0 children per woman in Austria and Germany to 2.5 in Sweden. There is
little variation between preferences of women in the 30–34 age group and women of
other age groups. Changes in preferences from successive surveys are not available for
most of these countries. Exceptions include the US and the Netherlands where prefer-
ences have been virtually stable since the 1970s (Peterson 1995; De Graaf 1995).
The preferences for age group 30–34 were selected for inclusion in Table 2 be-
cause this age group represents cohorts born around 1960 (the surveys were mostly
conducted in the early 1990s). These preferences can be compared with the CFR for the
1960 cohort to determine the level of preference implementation. In an ideal world women
would bear the number of children they want, but this clearly is not the case in contem-
porary developed countries. A comparison of wanted number of children with the com-
pleted fertility estimates from Table 1 shows that actual cohort fertility falls well short
of women’s preferences. The shortfall averages 0.3 births per woman in this set of coun-
tries. The reasons for this shortfall are not obvious, but they are likely to include com-
peting preferences for a career, marital disruption, celibacy, and infecundity. This find-
Table 2 Number of children ultimately wanted by women aged 30–34 and
completed fertility rate of the 1960 cohort
Number of Completed fertility
children wanted 1960 cohort
Austria 1996 2.0 1.69
Belgium 1991–92 2.1 1.84
Finland 1992 2.2 1.95
France 1994 2.3 2.10
Germany 1992 2.0 1.65
Hungary 1992–93 2.1 2.02
Italy 1995–96 2.1 1.65
Netherlands 1993 2.1 1.85
Norway 1988–89 2.2 2.09
Poland 1991 2.3 2.18
Portugal 1997 2.1 1.90
Spain 1994–95 2.2 1.75
Sweden 1992–93 2.5 2.04
Switzerland 1994–95 2.2 1.77
United States 1995 2.3 2.02
Sources: For number of children wanted: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (various
years); US DHHS 1997. For completed fertility see Table 1.
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ing suggests that efforts to help women overcome the various obstacles to the imple-
mentation of their preferences would lead to higher fertility, with cohort fertility at least
potentially not far below the replacement level.
DISTORTIONS OF PERIOD FERTILITY MEASURES
The preceding discussion summarized recent levels and trends in period and co-
hort fertility, their birth-order components, and their timing. We next examine the inter-
relations among these measures.
Empirical evidence of tempo distortions
Demographers have long known that changes in the timing of childbearing affect
the relationship between cohort and period fertility. Norman Ryder (1956, 1964, 1980,
1983) has written a series of influential articles on this subject. He demonstrated that
period fertility is lower than cohort fertility when the mean age at childbearing rises and
the reverse is true when the mean age at childbearing declines. In effect, when succes-
sive cohorts delay childbearing their births are spread out over a larger number of years
than would be the case if the timing were constant; the result is a reduction in period
fertility. Conversely, when successive cohorts are advancing their childbearing, their
births accumulate more rapidly in periods, thus inflating period fertility relative to co-
hort fertility. These effects are sizable: one year’s worth of births is lost/gained for every
one year rise/decline in the timing of childbearing during a specific interval of time. The
difference between period and cohort fertility caused by changes in the timing of births
is called the tempo or timing effect. This tempo effect may be considered a distortion be-
cause it changes the TFR in ways that most analysts are either not aware of or wish to avoid.
The existence of timing distortions is readily documented when the age at child-
bearing is declining rapidly. In that case, implausible results are usually obtained for
birth-order components of the TFR. For example, as shown in Figure 4, in most years
during the 1950s TFR
1
 in the US exceeded 1.0, which suggests that women had more
than one first birth on average. This is impossible and these TFR
1
 estimates must there-
fore be reinterpreted. The main reason why TFR
1
 is higher than 1.0 during many baby
boom years is that the age at childbearing declined, with the MAC
1
 changing from 23.3
14
years in 1950 to 22.4 years in 1960. This decline resulted in a temporary inflation of
TFR
1
. The size of this tempo distortion at birth-order 1 can be estimated as the differ-
ence between the average TFR
1
 in the 1950s and the CFR
1
 of the 1930 cohort, which had
most of its first births during the 1950s. The average tempo distortion was positive and
equal to 0.10 births (or 11 percent) in the US during the 1950s, because the average
observed TFR
1
 was 1.00 and the CFR
1
 for the 1930 cohort was 0.90.
A negative tempo effect is more difficult to document, because an examination of
observed birth-order components of the TFR does not usually produce obvious incon-
sistencies. However, a persuasive case for such an effect can be made in a number of
contemporary countries. For example, as shown in Figure 5, the average TFR
1
 during
the 1980s in Denmark was 0.68. If taken at face value this estimate implies that 32
percent of women were childless. This is clearly an unrealistic estimate, because the









































Source: Bongaarts and Feeney 1998.
Figure 4   Total fertility rate for birth-order 1 and mean age of women at first birth,
United States, 1950–60
15
1980s) is 12 percent and its CFR
1
 equals 0.88 (Sardon 2001). In this case, the TFR
1
contains a downward distortion because the mean age at first birth rose by 1.9 years
from 24.5 to 26.4 years during the 1980s. The size of this tempo distortion is –0.20
births per woman, or 23 percent below the cohort level.
These comparisons of the fertility of the 1960 cohort and period fertility during
the 1980s for birth-order 1, and the relationship of their difference to the timing of first
births have been repeated for 18 populations. Key results from this exercise are summa-
rized in Figure 6. The horizontal axis plots the change in the mean age at first births
during the 1980s (i.e., MAC
1
 in 1990 minus MAC
1
 in 1980) and the vertical axis plots
the tempo effect measured as the percentage difference between the CFR
1
 of the 1960
cohort and the average TFR
1
 during the 1980s.5 Each point in this figure represents one
country. For example, Denmark, the country with the largest negative distortion during
the 1980s, had a –23 percent distortion and a 1.9-year increase in MAC
1






































Source: Council of Europe 2000; Sardon 2001.






United States during the 1950s experienced an upward distortion of 11 percent because
the MAC
1
 declined by 0.9 years. In general, the preceding analysis indicates that the
tempo effect should be 0 when MAC
1
 is constant, it should be negative when MAC
1
rises, and it should be positive when MAC
1
 declines. The results presented in Figure 6
confirm these expectations: the tempo effect is strongly and inversely associated with
the change in the mean age during the 1980s (R2=0.95) This finding provides clear
support for the existence of tempo distortions of period fertility.
Theoretical estimates of tempo effects
Up to this point only empirical evidence for a tempo effect has been examined.
We next discuss the magnitude of the tempo effect expected on theoretical grounds and

































Change in mean age 1980–90 (years)
Observed
Sources: Council of Europe 2000; Sardon 2000, 2001; Sato 2001; Bongaarts and Feeney 1998.
Figure 6   Relationship between the tempo effect (percent) at birth-order 1 and the increase









In a recent study, Bongaarts and Feeney (1998) propose a procedure for remov-
ing tempo effects from the total fertility rate. They demonstrate that (provided fertility is
affected only by period effects6), the observed total fertility rate in any given year is









In this equation TFR
o
 is the observed total fertility rate component for birth-order
o, TFR’
o
 is the tempo-free total fertility rate component for birth-order o, and m
o
 is the
annual change in the mean age of the age-specific fertility schedule for birth-order o
during the year the TFR is observed. Multiplying the tempo-free TFR’
o
 by the distortion
component (1 – m
o
) yields the observed TFR
o
. For example, according to equation (1),










. Similarly, an annual decline in the mean age at a rate of just 0.1 years per year
(m
o
 = –0.1) inflates the TFR
o
 by 10 percent. Apparently, rather modest changes in the
timing of childbearing at any birth order can produce substantial changes in observed
fertility. These tempo effects operate instantaneously, that is, a change up or down in the
timing of childbearing from one year to the next as measured by m
o 
results in simulta-
neous changes in the TFR relative to the tempo-free TFR.
In practice, the TFR
o









By dividing the observed total fertility rate by (1 – m
o
) at any given birth-order o,
one obtains an estimate of the total fertility rate that would have been observed had there
been no change in the timing of childbearing. Applying this equation separately to all





. The difference TFR’ – TFR equals the absolute tempo effect.
The tempo-adjusted TFR’ should be interpreted as a variant of the conventional
TFR. The conventional TFR is defined as the number of births women would have by
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the end of the childbearing years (i.e., the completed fertility) if the age-specific fertility
rates observed in a given year applied throughout the childbearing years. This is a hypo-
thetical rate because no actual cohort will experience these observed period fertility
rates. The adjusted TFR’ is a similar hypothetical measure, but it differs because the
distortions caused by tempo changes during the year are removed. Neither the TFR nor
the TFR’ attempts to estimate the completed fertility of any actual birth cohort, nor do
they attempt any prediction of future fertility. The goal of the TFR’ is simply to remove
tempo distortions in observed total fertility rates.
The above tempo-adjustment formula (2) has been independently derived by
Kohler and Philipov (2001). They advance a more general equation, which incorporates
variance effects, but their formula reduces to equation (2) when the shape of the fertility
schedule is invariant.
Finally, to compare the theoretical and empirical analysis, we make use of the
fact that cohort fertility equals the tempo-adjusted period fertility when cohort and pe-
riod fertility are constant (but not necessarily equal) and the mean age at childbearing at
each order changes by a constant amount each year (Bongaarts and Feeney 1998). In
practice these conditions are not observed in any actual population, but during the 1980s
these conditions were observed approximately in many developed countries for births
of order 1. In that case the tempo effect at order 1 calculated by comparing the 1960
cohort with period fertility during the 1980s (as in Figures 2 and 6) should be the same
as the tempo effect calculated from equation (1) from the annual mean change in the age
at first birth during the 1980s. According to equation (1) the proportional tempo distor-
tion of the average TFR
1




 in 1980 minus MAC
1
in 1990 divided by 10): the more rapid the rise in MAC
1
, the larger the downward tempo
distortion. This implies that in a plot of m
1
 versus the proportional tempo distortion
during the 1980s, countries should lie along a line going through the origin at a minus
45-degree angle. This expected model relationship is plotted in Figure 6 as the dashed
line. This line is very close to and statistically indistinguishable from the observed pat-
tern plotted in Figure 6, indicating that in this set of countries the observed tempo effect
calculated as the difference between cohort and period fertility is well predicted by the
above model equation. In other words, the empirical and theoretical analyses of the
tempo effects are consistent with each other.
19
Estimates of tempo-adjusted TFR
The tempo effects that so clearly affect the TFR
1
 also affect the TFR components
for higher birth orders. These tempo effects at higher orders can be larger or smaller than
those at order 1 depending on the annual changes in the mean ages at different orders. As
noted, the adjustment procedure for eliminating tempo effects is applied separately to
all orders, and summing these order-specific results then produces the adjusted TFR’.
Since the data required for the tempo adjustment were not available in the precise form
needed, an indirect procedure was used to calculate the mean ages of births of orders
above the first, as described in the Appendix. These results should be regarded as ap-
proximations. Estimation of the TFR’ with this procedure was possible in 19 countries
for the period 1980 to the late 1990s, with the latest available year varying slightly
among countries.
The results of this exercise are summarized in Table 3, which provides average
observed and tempo-adjusted TFRs for two periods, 1980–94 and 1990–ca.97. Results
for France, Germany, and the United Kingdom could not be included in this table be-
cause available statistics give births by order within current marriage rather than by
biological order for the mother as required for the application of the tempo-adjustment
procedure. The main finding in Table 3 is that the tempo effects (measured in births per
woman) in the last two columns are negative in the large majority of countries. This
implies that observed TFRs contain a downward distortion. As expected, the tempo
effects vary among countries, with the largest effects in the 1990s in Spain (–0.42), the
Czech Republic (–0.40), and Greece and Italy (–0.34). In contrast, in a few Eastern
European countries (not shown), the tempo effect was positive in the 1980s. In most coun-
tries the tempo effect is more negative in the early 1990s than in the 1980s (data not shown).
A comparison of the average tempo-adjusted total fertility rate for 1980–94 in
Table 3 and the completed fertility of the 1960 cohort in Table 1 reveals generally small
but significant differences in a number of countries. These differences are due to three
distinct factors: a) the approximate nature of the current estimates of TFR’ (owing to the
unavailability of published data needed for its calculation); b) violations of the assump-
tions on which the tempo-adjustment equation (2) are based; and c) variations in cohort
and period fertility over time. In other words, the TFR’ and the CFR would have been
equal if the data for the calculation of the TFR’ were available and accurate, if the as-
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sumptions underlying equation (2) were not violated, and if cohort and period fertility
were constant. When only the first two of these conditions are valid, then the tempo-
adjusted TFR’ is not equal to the CFR, but the TFR’ gives an accurate estimate of the
total fertility rate that would be observed in the absence of changes in the timing of
childbearing. Of course, in reality, the assumptions on which equation (2) are based are
also not entirely valid, and estimates of TFR’ are therefore approximate.
Tempo and quantum of fertility
The implication of the preceding analysis is that observed total fertility rates are
determined by both the quantum and tempo of period fertility. The terms quantum and
tempo are used here to refer to components of the TFR observed during any given year
Table 3 Estimates of observed and tempo-adjusted TFR and the tempo effect,
1980–94 and 1990–ca. 1997
Adjusted total
 Total fertility rate  fertility rate Tempo effect
1980–94 1990–ca.97 1980–94 1990–ca.97 1980–94 1990–ca.97
Austria 1.46 1.43 1.64 1.62 –0.18 –0.19
Bulgaria 1.85 1.39 1.89 1.56 –0.04 –0.17
Czech Republic 1.89 1.49 2.01 1.89 –0.12 –0.40
Denmark 1.57 1.75 1.86 2.03 –0.30 –0.28
Finland 1.72 1.79 1.84 1.94 –0.13 –0.15
Greece 1.64 1.35 1.89 1.69 –0.25 –0.34
Hungary 1.81 1.62 1.95 1.88 –0.14 –0.26
Ireland 2.40 1.95 2.67 2.26 –0.27 –0.31
Italy 1.38 1.27 1.70 1.62 –0.32 –0.34
Japan 1.65 1.46 1.85 1.63 –0.20 –0.17
Netherlands 1.55 1.58 1.85 1.83 –0.29 –0.25
Poland 2.15 1.81 2.16 2.06 –0.01 –0.25
Portugal 1.75 1.49 1.99 1.82 –0.25 –0.33
Romania 2.05 1.45 2.11 1.63 –0.07 –0.17
Russia 1.89 1.51 1.83 1.56 0.07 –0.05
Slovakia 2.12 1.71 2.15 2.04 –0.03 –0.32
Spain 1.58 1.25 1.95 1.68 –0.37 –0.42
Sweden 1.85 1.88 2.05 2.16 –0.20 –0.28
United States 1.92 2.05 2.06 2.21 –0.14 –0.16
Notes: For discussion see text and Appendix. Data for Austria are available for 1984–98.
Sources: Council of Europe 2000; Sato 2001; Bongaarts and Feeney 1998.
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as proposed by Bongaarts and Feeney (1998). The quantum component is what the TFR
would have been without tempo effects, that is, the quantum equals the tempo-adjusted
TFR. The tempo component is the difference between the quantum component and the
observed TFR. This formulation of quantum and tempo is different from Ryder’s. In his
work, quantum refers to the completed fertility of cohorts, and tempo to the timing or
mean ages of births within these cohorts. In Ryder’s cohort-based formulation, quantum
and tempo are observable quantities, if only after the cohorts in question have com-
pleted their childbearing years. In the alternative formulation used here, the terms quan-
tum and tempo have meaning and can be calculated only on the basis of a conceptualization
that introduces the tempo-adjusted TFR, a new indicator not used by Ryder.
Trends in period fertility are the net result of trends in tempo and quantum. There
are two situations in which an analysis of tempo effects is of special interest. The first is
in countries where the tempo effect is large. This is the case, for example, in Italy and
Spain during the 1990s as already discussed. In these two countries the effect is large
and negative, which implies that the observed TFR (1.27 and 1.25, respectively) is sub-
stantially lower than the undistorted rates of 1.62 and 1.68, respectively. The second
situation where an analysis of the tempo is important is in countries where the tempo
effect is changing rapidly. In such circumstances both the level and trend of the TFR can
give misleading impressions and tempo trends can mask underlying quantum trends. An
example of this occurred in the United States in the late 1980s. Between 1985 and 1990
the TFR rose from 1.84 to 2.07. However, this rise in the TFR was largely due to a
disappearance of the tempo effect, and the tempo-free TFR remained nearly constant
around 2.0 births per woman during this period (Bongaarts and Feeney 1998). Another
example of a country with a clear downward trend in the tempo effect is the Netherlands
during the 1990s. As shown in Figure 7, the tempo effect was about 0.35 at the begin-
ning of the 1990s, but it declined to about 0.10 in 1998. The TFR remained relatively
unchanged during most of this period, as the decline in the tempo effect offset a decline
in the tempo-free TFR. In the late 1990s the TFR turned up slightly and the reduction in
the tempo effect is apparently in part responsible for this upturn.
A rise in fertility has also been observed in 1999 in a number of other European
countries (Sardon 2001). Whether declines in tempo effects are responsible for or are
22
contributing to these slight upturns in fertility will remain unclear until additional data
become available.
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE FERTILITY
As in the past, future trends in the quantum and tempo of fertility will be driven
largely by socioeconomic developments. Most analysts attribute low and delayed fertil-
ity to the difficulties women in contemporary industrialized societies face in combining
childrearing with their education and a career, and to a rise in individualism and con-
sumerism (Frejka and Calot 2001; Lesthaeghe 2001; McDonald 2000; van de Kaa 1987).
These recent trends in childbearing are part of a larger process of social and demo-
graphic change usually referred to as the second demographic transition. In addition to
declines in fertility, these new transitions are typically accompanied by widespread


















Note: For discussion see text and Appendix.
Source: Council of Europe 2000.




changes in attitudes and behaviors regarding sexuality, contraception, cohabitation,
marriage, divorce and extramarital childbearing (van de Kaa 1987). Lesthaeghe (2001)
identifies the following set of factors affecting childbearing behavior in post-transitional
societies:
(i) increased female education and female economic autonomy; (ii) rising and
high consumption aspirations that created a need for a second income in house-
holds and equally fostered female labour force participation; (iii) increased in-
vestments in career developments of both sexes, in tandem with increased com-
petition in the workplace; (iv) rising “post-materialist” traits such as self
actualization, ethical autonomy, freedom of choice and tolerance for the non-
conventional; (v) a greater stress on the quality of life with a rising taste for
leisure as well; (vi) a retreat from irreversible commitments and a desire for main-
taining an “open future”; (vii) rising probabilities of separation and divorce, and
hence a more cautious “investment in identity.”
There is no agreement on which of these potential explanatory factors are most im-
portant in determining fertility trends—in part because, as Lesthaeghe (2001) aptly
notes, “we have more explanatory factors than observations.” In any case, explana-
tions are likely to vary from society to society and even if past behavior could be
explained, the implications for future fertility trends would not necessarily be clear,
because many trends may have run their course.
Future tempo effects
Although existing theory is of little help in projecting future trends in the quan-
tum of fertility, it is possible to make some general predictions about the tempo compo-
nent. Tempo effects are by their nature temporary. They exist only as long as the mean
age at childbearing rises, disappearing when the change in the timing of childbearing
ends. This is true regardless of the level of the mean age. The tempo effect becomes zero
even if the mean age is high, provided the latter is constant.
The combined consequences of future changes in the quantum and tempo effects
can lead to a wide range of possible outcomes. Figure 8 presents two illustrative ex-
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amples. Both scenarios assume that the current TFR is deflated by a significant negative
tempo effect, and that this tempo effect will disappear at some unspecified point in the
future because the mean age at childbearing will stop rising. The scenario presented in
Figure 8a further assumes that the quantum remains constant at current levels. As a
consequence of these two trends the TFR will rise over time from its current level to
equal the quantum, that is, the adjusted TFR. An example of such a trend is the United
States in the late 1980s, as discussed earlier.
A second scenario is summarized in Figure 8b. In this case the quantum of fertil-
ity is assumed to continue to decline over time. The disappearance of the tempo effect
again puts upward pressure on fertility, but the rise in the TFR is not as large as in Figure
8a because there is an offsetting decline in the quantum. This scenario corresponds roughly
to trends observed in the Netherlands in the 1990s as summarized in Figure 7. Of course
if the future decline in the quantum is sufficiently rapid, then it is possible that no rise at all or
a decline would be observed in the TFR, despite the disappearance of the tempo effect.
A number of other scenarios could be envisioned, although the two presented in
Figure 8 are deemed most plausible. It is obviously not possible to predict trends in the
Figure 8   Fertility impact of future reductions in the tempo effect
a. Fixed quantum
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quantum and tempo components in any future year. However, since the mean age at
childbearing cannot rise forever, it must stabilize eventually. When that happens the
disappearance of the tempo effect will put upward pressure on the TFR. In fact, even a
slowdown in the pace of increase in the timing of childbearing reduces the size of the
tempo effect and this in turn exerts upward pressure on period fertility.
It is of interest that the scenario depicted in Figure 8 is consistent with the fertility
projections made by the United Nations. As noted, the UN has recently abandoned its
earlier assumption that all countries will eventually maintain fertility at the replacement
level. The latest projections incorporate complex assumptions about future trends in
fertility in countries with below-replacement fertility. The main assumption is that in the
long run countries will level off at the completed fertility rate of cohorts born in the
early 1960s, which implies TFRs in 2050 between 1.7 and 1.9 births per woman for
most low-fertility countries (United Nations 2001). As is clear from the earlier discus-
sion, this assumption implies significant increases from current TFRs in the large major-
ity of developed countries. The reasoning behind the UN’s assumption is not spelled out
in detail, but the implied disappearance of the tempo effects and resulting future trends
in the TFR are broadly similar to those shown in Figure 8.
CONCLUSION
During much of the past half-century the attention of the scientific and policy
communities has focused on fertility declines, particularly in the developing world. By
the mid-1990s fertility transitions in most of these countries were well underway or
even nearing completion and these issues have therefore become somewhat less urgent.
Attention has increasingly turned to a relatively new and unexpected development, namely
the very low fertility observed in most post-transitional societies. The common past
view among demographers that fertility would level off at or near the replacement level
is now seen as ill-founded and indefensible (Demeny 1997). Replacement fertility has
become a theoretical threshold that has little or no meaning for individual couples build-
ing their families.
What happens next is far from clear. The future course of fertility in countries
where it is already at or below replacement is one of the most hotly debated issues in
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contemporary demography. There is no doubt that fertility in much of the developed
world has reached historic lows and will almost certainly remain below replacement in
the future. However, the present analysis has demonstrated that period fertility mea-
sures such as the TFR are temporarily depressed by a rise in the mean age at childbear-
ing in most of these countries. This postponement effect has been present in many de-
veloped countries since the 1970s and could continue for years into the future. But once
this rise ends—as it eventually must—the corresponding fertility-depressing effect stops,
thus putting upward pressure on period fertility. When the tempo effect becomes smaller
or disappears, the downward trend in period fertility could end, and a slight upturn is a
distinct possibility. Such a rise could occur even while the mean age at childbearing is
still rising, if the rate of increase is less steep than in the past. Additional upward pres-
sure on period fertility would result if the obstacles that prevent women from achieving
their desired family sizes could be removed. Women on average want about two chil-
dren in contemporary societies for which preference measures are available. Although
these preferences have been quite stable since the 1970s, there is, of course, no assur-
ance that preferences will remain at current levels in the future. Moreover, removing
existing obstacles to preference implementation is difficult and expensive.
In an analysis of the most recent fertility trends in the European Union (EU),
Sardon (2001) concludes: “Fertility...increased in over half of the [EU] member states in
1999 (Netherlands, France, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Luxemburg, Spain, Greece,
Italy, Portugal) plus Norway and Switzerland.” This is a reversal of past trends even
though the increases are small. Furthermore, if the upward trend continues, future in-
creases are likely to remain small. It is too early to tell why the reversal is happening and
whether it is a temporary phenomenon. In view of the analysis presented here this new
development is not a surprise; indeed one would expect an end or reversal of the down-
ward trend in fertility sooner or later. The implication is that countries with very low
fertility and substantial tempo effects in the EU and elsewhere could well experience a
period of modest rises in fertility in the near future if the timing of childbearing stabi-
lizes. Even if this happens, however, it seems highly unlikely that fertility will rebound
to the replacement level.
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APPENDIX
Data for this study are primarily taken from Council of Europe (2000) and Sardon
(2000, 2001). These references provide annual statistics for the following variables in
many European countries:
TFR: Total fertility rate (all birth orders combined)
TFR
1
: Total fertility rate for births of order 1
MAC: mean age at childbearing (all orders combined)
MAC
1
: mean age at first birth
B: total number of births (all orders combined)
B
o
: number of births of orders 1,2,3,4, and 5+ (o is birth order)




 for birth or-
ders above 1, the following indirect procedure was developed.
Estimates of the TFR
o















+(o – 1)I, (A2)
where I equals the interval between the mean ages at successive birth orders. I is as-
sumed constant across birth orders but varies with time. The average age at childbearing


































Substitution of the order components of the TFR from (A1) in (A4) gives an
estimate of I that when substituted in (A2) gives estimates of MAC
o
. Application of








 were available for the Netherlands from
Eurostat (1997), it is possible to compare the above indirect procedure for estimating




 for each year from 1980 to
1994. The average absolute error in the TFR’ during this 14-year period resulting from
the above indirect procedure was 0.008 births per woman. This small error suggests that
the proposed indirect procedure is sufficiently accurate for present purposes. In general
the procedure gives acceptable results in countries with very low fertility, but the accu-
racy declines as the proportion of fertility at birth orders 2+ rises. The procedure is not
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1 In this study the term developed world is used to refer to what the UN (2001)
calls the “More developed regions,” which comprise Europe, Northern America,
Japan, Australia, and New Zealand.
2 Once the components CFR
o
 are known, other order-specific measures can be calcu-










3 It is computationally straightforward to calculate total fertility for any specific
birth order. Instead of including births of all orders in the numerators of the age-
specific fertility rates on which the TFR is based, only births of a single order are
included and the same denominators are used. The results of such a calculation
for each birth order o is a set of birth-order components TFR
o
 that when summed
equal the TFR (TFR=Σ TFR
o
).
4 For first births the period 1980–89 is used for comparison with fertility of the
1960 cohort, because the large majority of first births occur when women are
between ages 20 and 30.
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is measured at the beginning of 1980 and of 1990 to obtain the change during the
1980s.
6 The central assumption is that the shape of the age schedule of fertility at each
birth order does not change during the period for which the TFR is measured.
That is, variations in these schedules are limited to multiplication by a constant
factor to move the level of period age-specific birth rates up or down and transla-
tion to lower or higher ages to change the timing of childbearing. This implies an
absence of cohort effects because the postponement or advancement of births
occurs uniformly over all ages within a period. For further discussion of this
tempo-adjustment procedure see Bongaarts and Feeney (2000), Kim and Schoen
(2000), and van Imhoff and Keilman (2000).
References
Bongaarts, John. 1999a. “The fertility impact of changes in the timing of childbearing in
the developing world,” Population Studies 53: 277–289.
———. 1999b. “Fertility decline in the developed world: Where will it end?” American
Economic Review 89(2): 256–260.
Bongaarts, John and Rodolfo A. Bulatao. 2000. Beyond 6 Billion: Forecasting the World’s
Population. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
Bongaarts, John and Griffith Feeney. 1998. “On the quantum and tempo of fertility,”
Population and Development Review 24(2): 271–291.
———. 2000. “On the quantum and tempo of fertility: Reply,” Population and Devel-
opment Review 26(3): 560–564.
Calot, Gérard. 1999. “Fertility in Europe and North America,” in UN/ECE, Proceedings
of Regional Population Meeting, December 1998. Budapest.
Caldwell, John C. 1982. Theory of Fertility Decline. New York: Academic Press.
Chesnais, Jean-Claude. 1996. “Fertility, family, and social policy in contemporary Western
Europe,” Population and Development Review 22(4): 729–739.
30
———. 1998. “Below replacement fertility in the European Union (EU-15): Facts and
policies, 1960–1997,”  Review of Population and Social Policy 7: 83–101.
Coale, Ansley J. 1986. “Demographic effects of below-replacement fertility and their
social implications,” in Kingsley Davis, Mikhail S. Bernstam, and Rita Ricardo-
Campbell (eds.), Below-Replacement Fertility in Industrial Societies: Causes,
Consequences, Policies (Supplement to Population and Development Review,
vol. 12), pp. 203–216. New York: Population Council.
Coleman, David. 1996. “New patterns and trends in European fertility: International
and sub-national comparisons,” in David Coleman (ed.), Europe’s Population in
the 1990s. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1–61.
Council of Europe. 2000. Recent Demographic Developments in Europe 2000. Strasbourg:
Council of Europe Publishing.
De Graaf, A. 1995. “Vrouwen zijn minder onzeker over hun kindertal,” Maandstatistiek
van de Bevolking 43(1): 14–20.
Demeny, Paul. 1997. “Replacement-level fertility: The implausible endpoint of the de-
mographic transition,” in Gavin W. Jones et al. (eds.), The Continuing Demo-
graphic Transition. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 94–110.
———. 1999. “Policy interventions in response to below-replacement fertility,” in Be-
low Replacement Fertility, Population Bulletin of the United Nations, Nos. 40/
41. New York: United Nations, 2000.
Eurostat. 1997. Unpublished data provided to author.
Frejka, Tomas and Gérard Calot. 2001. “Cohort reproductive patterns in low-fertility
countries,” Population and Development Review 27(1): 103–132.
Kim, Young J. and Robert Schoen. 2000. “On the quantum and tempo of fertility: Limits
to the Bongaarts–Feeney adjustment,” Population and Development Review 26(3):
554-559.
Kohler, Hans-Peter and D. Philipov. 2001. “Variance effects in the Bongaarts–Feeney
formula,” Demography 38(1): 1–16.
Lesthaeghe, Ron. 2001. “Postponement and recuperation: Recent fertility trends and
forecasts in six Western European countries,” paper presented at the IUSSP Semi-
31
nar on “International Perspectives on Low Fertility: Trends, theories, and Poli-
cies,” Tokyo, 21–23 March.
Lesthaeghe, Ron and Paul Willems. 1999. “Is low fertility a temporary phenomenon in
the European Union?” Population and Development Review 25(2): 211–228.
McDonald, Peter. 2000. “Gender equity in theories of fertility transition,” Population
and Development Review 26(3): 427–439.
Ní Bhrolcháin, Máire. 1992. “Period paramount? A critique of the cohort fertility ap-
proach to fertility,” Population and Development Review 18(4): 599–629.
OECD. 1998. Maintaining Prosperity in an Ageing Society. Paris: Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development.
Peterson, Linda. 1995. “Birth expectations of women in the United States: 1973–88,” Vital
and Health Statistics, Series 23. Data from the National Survey of Family Growth
1995(17): 1–36.
Ryder, Norman B. 1956. “Problems of trend determination during a transition in fertil-
ity,” Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly 34 (1).
_____. 1964. “The process of demographic translation,” Demography 1(1): 74–82.
_____. 1980. “Components of temporal variations in American fertility,” in R.W. Hiorns
(ed.), Demographic Patterns in Developed Societies. London: Taylor & Francis, pp.
15–54.
_____. 1983. “Cohort and period measures of changing fertility,” in Rodolfo A. Bulatao
and Ronald D. Lee (eds.), Determinants of Fertility in Developing Countries,
Vol. 2. New York: Academic Press, pp. 737–756.
Sardon, Jean Paul. 2000. “The demographic situation of Europe and the developed coun-
tries overseas,” Population: An English Selection (12): 293–328.
_____. 2001. Unpublished data on total fertility rate for birth order one.
Sato, Ryuzaburo. 2001. Unpublished data provided to author.
United Nations. 1999. World population prospects: The 1998 Revision. New York.
_____. 2001. World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision. New York.
32
UN Economic Commission for Europe. Fertility and Family Surveys in Countries of the
ECE Region. New York and Geneva: Standard Country Reports for: Austria 1998;
Belgium 1999; Finland 1998; France 1998; Germany 1996; Hungary 1999; Italy
2000; Netherlands 1997; Norway 1996; Poland 1997; Portugal 2000; Spain 1999;
Sweden 1997; Switzerland 1999.
United Nations Population Division. 2000a. “Future expectations for below-replace-
ment fertility,” in Below Replacement Fertility, Population Bulletin of the United
Nations, Nos. 40/41, 1999. New York: United Nations, pp. 137–160.
_____. 2000b. “Fertility trends among low fertility countries,” in Below Replacement
Fertility, Population Bulletin of the United Nations, Nos. 40/41, 1999. New York:
United Nations, pp. 35–125.
US Department of Health and Human Services (US DHHS). 1997. Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention. National Center for Health Statistics. Fertility, Family
Planning and Women’s Health: New Data from the 1995 National Survey of Family
Growth. Series 23, No. 19. Hyattsville, MD.
World Bank. 1994. Averting the Old Age Crisis. New York: Oxford University Press.
van de Kaa, Dirk J. 1987. “Europe’s second demographic transition,” Population Bulle-
tin 42(1).
van Imhoff, Evert and Nico Keilman. 2000. “On the quantum and tempo of fertility:
Comment,” Population and Development Review 26(3): 549–553.
Ventura, Stephany J. et al. 1997. “Report of final natality statistics, 1995,” Monthly Vital
Statistics Report 45(11S): 1–40.
*120 John Bongaarts, “The fertility im-
pact of changes in the timing of child-
bearing in the developing world.”
*121 James F. Phillips, Wendy L. Greene,
and Elizabeth F. Jackson, “Lessons
from community-based distribution
of family planning in Africa.”
*122 Mark R. Montgomery, “Mortality
decline and the demographic re-
sponse: Toward a new agenda.”
*123 Mark R. Montgomery, Mary
Arends-Kuenning, and Cem Mete,
“The quantity-quality transition in
Asia.”
124 Barbara S. Mensch, Wesley H.
Clark, Cynthia B. Lloyd, and
Annabel S. Erulkar, “Premarital sex
and school dropout in Kenya: Can
schools make a difference?”
*125 John Bongaarts and Rodolfo A.
Bulatao, “Completing the demo-
graphic transition.”
126 Geoffrey McNicoll, “Population
weights in the international order.”
*127 Cynthia B. Lloyd, Carol E.
Kaufman, and Paul Hewett, “The
spread of primary schooling in sub-
Saharan Africa: Implications for
fertility change.”
128 John B. Casterline, “The onset and
pace of fertility transition: National
patterns in the second half of the
twentieth century.”
*129 Mark R. Montgomery, Michele
Gragnolati, Kathleen Burke, and
Edmundo Paredes, “Measuring liv-
ing standards with proxy variables.”
130 Bamikale Feyisetan and John B.
Casterline, “Fertility preferences
and contraceptive change in devel-
oping countries.”
*131 Martin Brockerhoff, “Urban growth
in developing countries: A review
of projections and predictions.”
132 Omaima El-Gibaly, Barbara Ibra-
him, Barbara S. Mensch, and Wes-
ley H. Clark, “The decline of female
circumcision in Egypt: Evidence
and interpretation.”
1999
POLICY RESEARCH DIVISION WORKING PAPERS
Recent Back Issues
* No longer available
133 Mary Arends-Kuenning and Sajeda
Amin, “The effects of schooling in-
centive programs on household re-
source allocation in Bangladesh.”
134 John Bongaarts and Charles F. West-
off, “The potential role of contracep-
tion in reducing abortion.”
135 John B. Casterline and Steven W.
Sinding, “Unmet need for family
planning in developing countries and
implications for population policy.”
*136 Carol E. Kaufman, Thea de Wet, and
Jonathan Stadler, “Adolescent pregnan-
cy and parenthood in South Africa.”
*137 Valerie L. Durrant and Zeba A.
Sathar, “Greater investments in chil-
dren through women’s empower-
ment: A key to demographic change
in Pakistan?”
138 Sajeda Amin, Alaka Malwade Basu,
and Rob Stephenson, “Spatial varia-
tion in contraceptive use in Bangla-
desh: Looking beyond the borders.”
2000
139 Geoffrey McNicoll, “Managing pop-
ulation–environment systems: Prob-
lems of institutional design.”
140 Barbara S. Mensch, Barbara L. Ibra-
him, Susan M. Lee, and Omaima El-
Gibaly, “Socialization to gender roles
and marriage among Egyptian ado-
lescents.”
141 John Bongaarts and Elof Johansson,
“Future trends in contraception in the
developing world: Prevalence and
method mix.”
142 Alaka Malwade Basu and Sajeda
Amin, “Some preconditions for fer-
tility decline in Bengal: History, lan-
guage identity, and an openness to
innovations.”
143 Zeba Sathar, Cynthia B. Lloyd, Cem
Mete, and Minhaj ul Haque, “School-
ing opportunities for girls as a stimu-
lus for fertility change in rural Pa-
kistan.”
144 John Bongaarts, “Household size
and composition in the developing
world.”
145 John B. Casterline, Zeba A. Sathar,
and Minhaj ul Haque, “Obstacles to
contraceptive use in Pakistan: A
study in Punjab.”
2001
* No longer available
146 Zachary Zimmer,  Albert I. Herma-
lin, and Hui-Sheng Lin, “Whose edu-
cation counts? The impact of grown
children’s education on the physi-
cal functioning of their parents in
Taiwan.”
147 Philomena Nyarko, Brian Pence,
and Cornelius Debpuur, “Immuni-
zation status and child survival in
rural Ghana.”
148 John Bongaarts and Zachary
Zimmer,  “Living arrangements of
older adults in the developing
world: An analysis of DHS house-
hold surveys.”
149 Markos Ezra, “Ecological degrada-
tion, rural poverty, and migration in
Ethiopia: A contextual analysis.”
150 Cynthia B. Lloyd, Sahar El Tawila,
Wesley H. Clark, and Barbara S.
Mensch, “Determinants of educa-
tional attainment among adoles-
cents in Egypt: Does school quality
make a difference?”
151 Barbara S. Mensch, Paul C. Hewett,
and Annabel Erulkar, “ The report-
ing of sensitive behavior among
adolescents: A methodological ex-
periment in Kenya.”
152 John Bongaarts, “The end of the fer-
tility transition in the developed
world.”
